Book Commentary: The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB

The identity of Golitsyn's highly exaggerated CIA penetration "SASHA" is resolved unequivocally here. The individual involved was Aleksandr G. Kopatskiy, alias Koischwitz, (eventually "Igor Orlov") and his pseudonym was not Sasha, but other vague information Golitsyn reported about him was correct, just not enough to identify him for certain. Presumably that leaves open the report of Nosenko that there was a KGB asset with the pseudonym "SASHA" somewhere in the US military.

A peculiar aspect of the background of KGB/StB asset Koecher, cited here, a Soviet Division translator who compromised CKTRIGON, is that he had broken off KGB/StB relations when he joined CIA in 1973. Not long after his security clearance, including polygraph, had come through, he applied to the StB to establish his role as a CIA penetration, which was accepted by the StB/KGB.

Nosenko is credited with our finding forty bugs in bamboo tubes behind the radiators in the US embassy, in direct contradiction to the report questioning Nosenko's bona fides, that Golitsyn's report of the bugs was just duplicated by Nosenko.

Nosenko's treatment by CIA is denigrated, based on Mitrokhin's documents, in which he is cited by the KGB as having been called a "particularly dangerous traitor", to be liquidated by a KGB illegal, along with Golitsyn, should they appear at the 1967 Montreal World Fair.

When the KGB could track down only two defectors from 1973 to 1979, probably Petrov and Deryabin, the KGB chief dismissed them, saying that if Lyalin and Nosenko could be found, he would approve their assassination. After Artamonov was killed by a drug overdose when he was kidnapped by the KGB in Vienna in 1975, the KGB chief asked those responsible which medal they would prefer, for killing a traitor. So much for the theories of some CIA officers that Nosenko and Artamonov were really KGB assets.

Another witch hunt which Mitrokhin puts to rest is Wright's Golitsyn-inspired effort to prove that his MI-5 chief or deputy, Hollis or Mitchell, was a KGB asset. Mitrokhin found nothing even suggesting that either of them was a KGB developmental operation. Another Wright suspect, Labor party chief Wilson, also is exonerated by Mitrokhin's documents. These findings were confirmed by defected KGB London rezident, and MI-5 asset , Gordiyevskiy. Wright's acknowledged technical expertise hardly qualified him to be a counterintelligence analyst.

The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB, Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, 1999

http://www.amazon.com/The-Sword-Shield-Mitrokhin-Archive/dp/0465003125

Book Commentary: Der Überläufer

The author had been my primary contact on East German matters in the West German Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz (BfV) from 1978 until 1985. His defection in August 1985, three months after my retirement in Europe, came very much as a surprise. Strangely, I am referred to in the book as "John McCoy". Of course, while, in our discussions, in German, we referred to one another as “Herr Tiedge" and "Herr McCoy", it is odd that Tiedge never learned, or had forgotten, my first name! I am described as having left Vietnam on the last helicopter, which obviously relates to Tom Polgar, our last COS Saigon, whom Tiedge also had met. Tiedge learned of the volunteering of his subordinate, Kuron, to the MfS after his defection.

Der Überläufer, Hans Joachim Tiedge, 1998

http://www.amazon.com/Uberlaufer-Eine-Lebensbeichte-German/dp/3360008634/

Book Commentary: Battleground Berlin

Numerous authors have reported that our Berlin tunnel, from which we collected Soviet phone calls made from Germany from Spring 1955 to Spring 1956, was producing only information prepared for us by the KGB, as they had known of the tunnel long before it was dug. Their penetration of MI-6, George Blake, was the recorder of the meeting we held with the British to discuss the tunnel plan. In fact, as the KGB co-author of the book, who was aware of the KGB action to have the tunnel "discovered" without compromising Blake, stated that the KGB had tried to increase security in phone conversations on the cables running through the tunnel, but could not take action to alert users of the lines, or even KGB officers who were not cleared to know of the Blake operation. Therefore, the information which we acquired from the tunnel was actually reliable and valuable as generally concluded at the time.

Battleground Berlin, David E. Murphy, 1997

http://www.amazon.com/Battleground-Berlin-CIA-vs-Cold/dp/0300072333/

Book Commentary: Confessions of a Spy: The Real Story of Aldrich Ames

Right after Ogorodnik (CKTRIGON) was arrested and committed suicide in KGB hands in Moscow, in July 1977, DCI Turner sent me a memo directing me to investigate his compromise, and come up with a conclusion in two weeks. When I started to work on it, reviewing Ogorodnik's production, which was no longer coming automatically to the CI Staff, as it would have in Angleton's days, I ran onto the disturbing cable cited here which appeared to report Kissinger's briefing the Soviet ambassador on US strategy for the SALT talks. In spite of that startling diversion, I went on with the investigation, which included visiting our translation/transcription team , which eventually turned out to harbor the Communist penetration which compromised Ogorodnik. That was Koecher, a Czech who had entered the US in 1965, was hired by us in 1973, and was not exposed by a Czech defector for another seven years. Had I even learned of his background, it is doubtful that I could have persuaded Security/FBI to conduct an investigation of him, including another polygraph examination. Since it had nothing to do with Ames, it is not quite clear why it appears here.

Confessions of a Spy: The Real Story of Aldrich Ames, Pete Earley, 1997

http://www.amazon.com/Confessions-Spy-Real-Story-Aldrich/dp/039914188X/

Book Commentary: Wedge

There is a good discussion of the contradictory reception of Golitsyn and Nosenko by CIA and the FBI, the FBI correctly accepting Nosenko as bona fide and doubting Golitsyn's theories and conclusions. However, in referring to Golitsyn's statement about CIA penetrations, it is not correct to give Golitsyn any credit in that respect. When first asked, including in a private meeting with DCI Dulles, whether he knew of any KGB penetration of CIA, he said he did not. He later came up with his "Sasha" lead, which led to false accusations against three case officers , but eventually turned out to be a low-level operational support agent in Munich and Berlin. But "Sasha" had been dismissed by CIA some months before Golitsyn defected. Nosenko is referred to as having duplicated Golitsyn's report on KGB technical penetration of the US embassy in Moscow. The significant difference is that Golitsyn's report was followed up by technical experts searching for such microphones in the embassy, but found none. In his report, Nosenko pointed out that the microphones and wiring were hidden behind the pipes and radiators of the heating system. The search was made and the microphones found. Nosenko has been blamed for not having reported on the microphone systems being installed in the new embassy building, but when the technicians tracked the wires to the roof of the existing embassy, they found another set of wires installed to support microphone installation in the new embassy building. They were buried in a similar manner to those in the old embassy building, but even more deeply embedded in the reinforcing cables.

The reporting on our replacement of Angleton and his staff operationally has little accurate objective information in it. it starts off saying that we wanted to reopen the KITTY HAWK operation, which was never so. The new staff came into it with no warning at all, only that Artamonov was scheduled to meet the KGB in Vienna in December 1975. We met with the FBI, whose case it was, to work out the plan for the meeting. We were described as having had no CI experience, although the Analysis element of the new staff was composed almost entirely of officers who had served in the Soviet Division CI Branch , and all had been involved in the major Soviet operations for up to 20 years. As Angleton had never cut the Soviet Division in on the operation, but turned it over to Security, it seemed time to place it back in the Clandestine Service by getting rid of the Security officer involved. The FBI objected when we met to discuss the operation, so he stayed on for the Vienna trip. There was no indication in the record that Angleton opposed Vienna at all, but the last meeting having taken place in Canada three years ago should have aroused our suspicions. At that point, Angleton had tried to use the meeting to prove his totally unjustified suspicions of the RCMP counterintelligence chief. There was no CIA conclusion that KITTY HAWK had been a provocateur, whether FBI thought so or not.

The ironic aspect of the CIA/FBI relations at that time was that the FBI decided that FEDORA and TOPHAT were under KGB control. By that time, we had asked the FBI to let us review the intelligence that TOPHAT had provided, to evaluate his bona fides. They agreed, and-we sent two of our most experienced CI analysts to the FBI to work for several days on their files. They returned with the conclusion that he was bona fide, a conclusion with which the FBI did not agree and which left them angry. TOPHAT continued to work for us very productively in Moscow, in Rangoon, and during his two tours in New Delhi. Not quite the KGB approach. FEDORA also continued to report reliably, although he was close to leaving New York after his second assignment and going into retirement.

There is an odd reference to the Kampiles case, stating that our photo analysts found the Soviets evading the KH-11 collection operation and that the FBI tracked down Kampiles. It was our asset in the GRU in Athens who identified Kampiles as having delivered the manual to the Soviets. The reference to Koecher, who compromised Ogorodnik (not Ogorodnikov), our asset in the Soviet Foreign Ministry , is of interest from the standpoint of just when the FBI began suspecting him. Koecher had been in the country for 8 years when we hired him in 1973 as a translator, (and polygraphed him with no deception indicated) but the FBI is said to have started their case against him in 1982—a little late for us, as he compromised Ogorodnik in 1977.

Wedge, Mark Riebling, 1994

http://www.amazon.com/Wedge-The-Secret-War-Between/dp/0679414711

Book Commentary: Case Closed

Regarding Nosenko's statement that the KGB had sent a cable to him in Geneva giving a phony reason for his returning at once to Moscow, the author makes the sensible argument that if he had been dispatched by the KGB, the KGB would surely have made a cable readily available to support his statement.

Case Closed, Gerald Posner, 1993

http://www.amazon.com/Case-Closed-Harvey-Oswald-Assassination-ebook/dp/B00F3QYGAG/

Book Commentary: The Spy Who Saved the World

Before the authors started writing this impressive book, they called me to visit them in the CIA office where they were working—since most of their reference material was classified. They just asked me to provide them with a list of those persons most able to provide them details of the operation and the impact of Penkovskiy's reporting. That was the last time I spoke to them, as l was leaving at once to accompany my wife on her assignment to Europe.

One puzzling thing that comes up in the book is the report that Kisevalter was born in the North Caucasus—that has appeared in other books, but he was actually born in St. Petersburg, as stated in "CIA Spymaster", essentially his autobiography.

As stated, my primary function with the Penkovskiy operational team was to provide the guidance as to what Penkovskiy should try to collect for us. That meant conducting liaison with MI-5, MI-6, and the British Defense Department. After each meeting with Penkovskiy, it was a matter of debriefing the team to see if there was anything timely or critical which needed to be forwarded to HQ at once, then briefing the team on matters to be taken up in the next meeting. After the September meetings in Paris, the British team leader, Shergold, told me that he wanted me to come to London, interview their Russian speakers, and set up a translation task force. When I sent that proposal to HQ, a message came back saying that the team was to be set up at HQ under my direction. Upon returning to HQ after the April meetings in London, I interviewed our Russian speakers and set up a translation team in Central Building; the second MI-6 case officer, Mike Stokes, was assigned as my partner, with the official title of MI-6 deputy station chief, and stayed with me for over a year.

That function was to review Penkovskiy's incoming documents, assign them priorities, review the translations, and take them to HQ for processing into reports. After reports were published, it was my responsibility to react to customer requests to use the information in finished intelligence, which meant visiting the agencies making the requests and assuring that their use of the information was not a risk to Penkovskiy's security, and that everything he had reported was included in their analysis.

The chapter " Return to London" omits an unpleasant operational development which was to reappear later in Paris to impact adversely on MI-6/CIA relations. When I arrived in London about a week before the second series of meetings started, in July 1961, to coordinate with MI-6, COS Wisner called me in and asked me to look at a HQ cable . The cable accused MI-6 of trying to steal the operation in Moscow, when the MI-6 station chief there wore a recognition signal so that Penkovskiy could, and did, identify him as a reliable contact.

Wisner asked for my opinion, and I replied that this was unhelpful nonsense. He thanked me and I left. When our team got there for the meetings, Wisner called for a meeting in the Carleton Gardens offices where we were meeting. The team met and Wisner asked Bulik to make his case. After he finished, Shergold responded. Wisner then thanked both of them and called the meeting over.

Another unfortunate complication arose when certain senior officers in HQ thought Penkovskiy should be polygraphed, in spite of the large volume of high- quality information he had already provided in the first series of some 20 meetings. The entire team opposed that for that reason. Also, the interpreter for cosmonaut Gagarin, who was visiting London, Belitskiy, had been recruited by us in Brussels in 1958, and had just been polygraphed. Asked to review his reporting, I concluded that he was under KGB control, in spite of the strong opinion of the polygraph operator and case officer that he was bona fide. MI-6 knew of my opinion, which did not help give them a strong feeling for the polygraph. (My Belitskiy analysis was not accepted by HQ until Golitsyn and Nosenko walked in and confirmed it in January 1962/June 1962!)

The report of Penkovskiy's being spotted walking down the Champs Elysees as the three-man American team sat at a café having a glass of wine is not quite right. When I saw him coming, I alerted Bulik, who, after he knew Penkovskiy saw him, got up and walked into an alley beside the café. Penkovskiy followed him, and after a few minutes, Bulik came back out, but Penkovskiy did not.

The awards which Quentin Johnson brought out from HQ for George and Joe were meant primarily to reassure George of our faith in him just before he was to be removed from the operation. .Ioe protested that an award also should be given to me, and Johnson said that would happen later. It never did. Some months after the operation ended in October 1962, my chief and l were given awards for preparation and dissemination of the Penkovskiy production. My involvement in the operational

team was never recognized until Shergold came to HQ in March 1998 and spoke about the operation to a full house in the HQ auditorium. When he started by identifying the team members, he gave my name and characterized me as “the unsung hero of the operation". In the "Circle of Treason", Vertefeuille and Grimes, is the statement: "The operational development by the CIA and its British partner, SIS (Special Intelligence Service), to capitalize on the opportunity has rightly been termed the most successful in the history of espionage". It remains a mystery after these 50 years as to why the “unsung hero" of the "most successful operation in the history of espionage" has never received from the CIA any recognition for that achievement!

The Spy Who Saved the World, Peter S. Deryabin and Jerrold L. Schecter, 1992

http://www.amazon.com/The-Spy-Who-Saved-World/dp/0684190680